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A published Eleventh Circuit opinion holds that release on Form I-220A under 8 U.S.C. 1226 is not the humanitarian parole the Cuban Adjustment Act requires, binding courts in Florida, Georgia and Alabama.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled on Nov. 17, 2026, that a Cuban family released at the border on Form I-220A, an Order of Release on Recognizance, was never “paroled into the United States” and so cannot adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA). In Aguiar-Fernandez v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 24-12318, a panel of Judges Elizabeth Branch, Andrew Brasher and Frank Hull denied the family’s petition for review in a 16-page opinion by Judge Brasher. The opinion is designated for publication, and no judge wrote separately.
The ruling matters because tens of thousands of Cubans who crossed the southern border since 2021 were released on I-220A forms instead of being paroled, and many live in Florida. It is a binding circuit precedent in the court that hears most CAA cases. It is the first published Eleventh Circuit decision on the question. An unpublished February 2026 decision had remanded groups of I-220A cases without deciding that an I-220A is parole.
The facts and the agency rulings
According to the opinion, Yoan Aguiar-Fernandez, his wife and their daughter entered near San Luis, Arizona, on June 25, 2021, and turned themselves in to Border Patrol. Each received a Form I-220A citing 8 U.S.C. 1226 and a notice to appear charging them as present without admission or parole under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). They conceded removability, applied for asylum, withholding and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), filed CAA adjustment applications, and separately asked DHS for humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A). DHS denied the parole request (slip op. 3).
The immigration judge found the family credible but pretermitted the CAA applications, reasoning that they had been released on conditional parole rather than humanitarian parole. The IJ also denied asylum, withholding and CAT protection and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed without opinion, so the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the IJ’s decision directly (slip op. 5–7).
Why the court said an I-220A is not CAA parole
The CAA lets a Cuban national adjust status if he or she was “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States” and has been present for at least a year. The court first noted that, while it ordinarily cannot review discretionary adjustment decisions, it can decide the legal questions raised here (slip op. 8 n.1).
On the merits, the panel read “paroled into the United States” in the CAA to mean humanitarian parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A), the same phrase courts have read the same way in the general adjustment statute, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). Relying on the presumption that identical words carry the same meaning, the court followed the Second Circuit’s decision in Cruz-Miguel v. Holder (2011): “We agree and adopt the same rule for the CAA” (slip op. 10). It also cited the Third Circuit (Delgado-Sobalvarro), the Ninth Circuit (Ortega-Cervantes) and the BIA’s Matter of Castillo-Padilla (2010).
The “conditional parole” in section 1226(a)(2)(B) uses different words and does a different job, the court said. Release under that provision “may be a type of generic parole,” Judge Brasher wrote, but it does not authorize parole into the United States (slip op. 11). The opinion puts the holding in one line: release under section 1226’s conditional parole provision “does not suffice” (slip op. 2).
Parole is a question of fact, not of detention authority
The family’s main argument was that, as border arrivals, they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), and the only lawful way to release such a person is humanitarian parole, so they must have been paroled as a matter of law. The court rejected that. Whether DHS granted humanitarian parole “is a question of historical fact,” the panel held, and it turns on the reason the agency actually gave, not on which detention statute should have applied (slip op. 12). Detention authority “might be relevant” only when the record leaves the agency’s reasoning unclear.
Here, the record was clear, the court said: the I-220As cited section 1226 regulations, the family’s own I-485s listed the I-220As as the basis for their presence, no Form I-94 was issued, and DHS denied their requests for humanitarian parole (slip op. 11–13).
Asylum, withholding and CAT also denied
The court also upheld the denial of protection. The claims rested on a 2016 dispute with a Cuban police captain after Aguiar-Fernandez returned from a government mission in Venezuela. The panel found that he and his wife were not arrested or interrogated afterward and kept their jobs, that the record suggests the captain acted in a private capacity, and that the incidents did not rise to persecution in any event (slip op. 14–16). Applying the deferential substantial-evidence standard reaffirmed in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, the court found nothing that compelled reversal.
What the ruling does not decide
- It does not hold that every I-220A holder is removable; it addresses CAA eligibility based on an I-220A release alone.
- It leaves room for cases where the record is ambiguous about why DHS released someone; there, the detention statute “might be relevant” (dicta).
- It does not address whether DHS’s denial of humanitarian parole can be reviewed.
- It does not resolve Bello-Rubio v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-23665 (S.D. Fla.), a suit by roughly 992 Cubans with I-220As before Judge Jacqueline Becerra. CubaHeadlines and Cubanos por el Mundo report that the judge denied a first government motion to dismiss in September and a second motion is pending.
What it means for practice
- Check the documents. Because parole is a factual question, the paperwork controls. Look for an I-94 or parole document that cites section 1182(d)(5)(A), not just an I-220A citing section 1226.
- Expect pretermission. Immigration judges and USCIS in the Eleventh Circuit can now rely on a published decision to deny CAA adjustment for clients whose only claimed parole is an I-220A release.
- Preserve arguments for ambiguous records. The opinion’s opening for unclear records, and the pending S.D. Fla. class litigation, may matter to clients with mixed or incomplete release documents.
- Consider other paths. Clients may need to pursue asylum or other relief, a humanitarian parole request, or a path that does not depend on an I-220A release. Weigh rehearing or certiorari options quickly.
Dates and decisions to watch
- Petition for rehearing deadline: generally 45 days after judgment when the United States is a party (Fed. R. App. P. 40), or about Jan. 1, 2027.
- Ruling on the second motion to dismiss in Bello-Rubio v. Noem (S.D. Fla.).
- Whether USCIS and EOIR in Florida begin citing Aguiar-Fernandez in pending I-220A adjustment cases.
For background on how USCIS has been deciding Cuban adjustment cases, see our report Cuban Green Card Approvals Fell to 23.7% Last Quarter, and our explainer on green card holders detained by ICE.
This article is for general information and is not legal advice.
Sources
- Aguiar-Fernandez v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 24-12318 (published opinion), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Nov. 17, 2026
- Court Ruling Deals Blow to Cuban Immigrants: I-220A Form Not Equivalent to Parole, CubaHeadlines, Nov. 17, 2026
- Tribunal de Atlanta dictamina que el I-220A no sirve como parole para la Ley de Ajuste Cubano, Cubanos por el Mundo, Nov. 17, 2026
- I-220A no equivale a parole: fallo fija precedente para el Ajuste Cubano, Directorio Cubano, Nov. 17, 2026
- I-220A Court Update: What Cuban Families Should Know (on the February 2026 unpublished ruling), Arias Villa, Aug. 5, 2026