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Judge Saylor’s eight-page final order goes further than his September ruling: it holds that DHS lacked statutory authority for the rule’s limits on F-1 academic mobility, and it explains why the whole rule was vacated rather than sent back to the agency.
On Nov. 16, U.S. District Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV of the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to the challengers in Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 1:26-cv-13799-FDS, and vacated DHS’s duration of status rule. Our earlier report covered what the ruling means for students and schools. This piece looks at the order itself: what the court decided, how it reasoned, and what that means for the appeal and for any new rule.
The short version for practitioners: the court rested its judgment on two independent grounds. One is the familiar arbitrary-and-capricious holding carried over from September. The other is new, a holding that the rule’s restrictions on what F-1 students may study are “contrary to statutory authority.” That second ground matters most for DHS, because better reasoning on remand cannot cure a lack of authority.
What the court decided
- Posture: Final judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkt. 73). Plaintiffs’ motion granted, the government’s denied, and the clerk directed to enter final judgment for plaintiffs.
- Relief: The Final Rule, 91 Fed. Reg. 44976 (July 17, 2026), is vacated in full under 5 U.S.C. § 706 as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law.” This replaces the Sept. 14 postponement of the effective date under 5 U.S.C. § 705.
- Plaintiffs: Three higher-education groups (the Presidents’ Alliance, NAFSA and the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts) and four labor organizations, including The NewsGuild-CWA and UAW Local 2322.
- Pending appeal: The government’s First Circuit appeal of the September order was still pending. The parties agreed that it did not stop the district court from deciding the merits (n.3).
The court’s reasoning
1. Arbitrary and capricious: the September analysis, adopted wholesale
The court found that the summary judgment issues were “virtually identical” to those at the preliminary injunction stage, so it adopted and incorporated its 48-page Sept. 14 memorandum. The four APA defects found there now support a final judgment. DHS did not properly weigh costs and benefits. Its fraud and national-security rationales did not support the rule. It did not consider less burdensome alternatives. And it did not respond adequately to significant comments. In September the court had said the security rationale “borders on the absurd.” Because a rule challenge raises no factual disputes, the likelihood-of-success analysis carried over directly to the merits (pp. 2-3).
For appellate purposes, this means the First Circuit will be reviewing the September opinion’s reasoning as much as the November order’s.
2. SEVIS: an alternative DHS had to weigh
Plaintiffs added an argument at summary judgment: DHS failed to consider making better use of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. The court walked through the existing tools (pp. 3-4):
- SEVP school certification and reporting duties under 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(f)-(g), with withdrawal of certification under § 214.4(a)(2);
- the parallel J-sponsor designation and reporting rules at 22 C.F.R. §§ 62.6 and 62.13(b);
- DSO certifications under penalty of perjury and background checks for responsible officers;
- DHS’s own record of using SEVIS data to prosecute “pay-to-stay” fraud and to screen students through the National Crime Information Center.
DHS argued that SEVIS is a “data-reporting system for schools, not an immigration-status adjudication system.” The court was not persuaded. DHS had not explained how a discretionary, unreviewable extension process after four years “meaningfully enhances the ability of DHS to root out cases of fraud,” or how that benefit outweighed the cost of abandoning duration of status. At a minimum, the agency had to weigh SEVIS enhancements against the rule’s costs, and it did not (p. 5). This is a classic State Farm alternatives holding: the agency need not adopt the alternative, but it must engage with it.
3. Statutory authority: the new holding on academic mobility
In September the court had reserved plaintiffs’ contrary-to-law claim. It decided that claim now (pp. 5-7). The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), covers a “bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study” who enters “solely” to pursue it. DHS argued it may define “course of study” by regulation. In the court’s description, DHS used that power to bar or restrict extended study such as Ph.D. programs, joint degrees, changes in academic concentration, and programs at the same or a lower level than one already completed.
The court borrowed its test from the D.C. Circuit’s OPT decision, Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS, 50 F.4th 164 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Under that test, Congress sets the terms of entry. DHS may set the “time” and “conditions” of stay, but only in ways “reasonably related to the nature and purpose of the F-1 visa class.” WashTech upheld OPT because it enriches a student’s education. Judge Saylor used the same test to reach the opposite result. Because the F-1 class exists to permit and encourage study in the United States, limits on which programs a bona fide student may pursue are not reasonably related to that purpose.
The court gave examples. A strong student who intends a joint graduate degree in electrical engineering and business is “without doubt” a bona fide student. DHS itself acknowledged in the preamble that some students have legitimate reasons to earn a second degree at the same level, such as an M.B.A. after a J.D. (91 Fed. Reg. at 45041). Yet the rule would effectively keep such a student out. Fraud and security concerns, the court added, are not reasonably related to the purpose of the F-1 program. Its conclusion: “The statute simply does not grant DHS such broad and open-ended authority” to undermine the program (p. 7).
4. Remedy: why vacatur, not remand
DHS asked for remand without vacatur. The court called vacatur the “standard remedy” under the APA and treated remand without vacatur as reserved for extraordinary cases where vacating would be “quite disruptive,” citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). This case was not one of them. Duration of status has been the rule for decades, and the Final Rule never took effect, so vacatur disrupts nothing (p. 7).
What the court rejected or left open
- The statutory holding reaches only F-1. It rests on § 1101(a)(15)(F) and the rule’s academic-mobility limits. The J-1 and I-visa provisions fall on the APA grounds alone, so a better-reasoned rule could in principle revisit them.
- The four-year cap itself. The order lists extended Ph.D. study among the restrictions DHS defended under its “course of study” power. But the conclusion is framed around “limitations on academic studies.” It does not squarely hold that DHS lacks power to set any fixed admission period. WashTech, the case the court relied on, expressly recognizes DHS’s authority over the “time” of stay. The government is likely to press that distinction on appeal.
- No Loper Bright discussion. The order reads the statute directly through WashTech‘s reasonable-relationship test. It does not discuss deference or how First Circuit law treats DHS’s reading of “course of study.”
- Scope. The order vacates the rule itself under § 706. It does not limit relief to plaintiffs’ members, and it does not discuss party-specific remedies.
What it means for practice
- Advising students and scholars: Pre-rule law governs. That means D/S admission, no Form I-539 extension filings, the 60-day post-completion period, and existing transfer and change-of-level procedures through the I-20 and SEVIS. The September postponement already meant the rule never applied, so nothing needs to be undone.
- Planning around a revival: Only a stay pending appeal, or a reversal, could bring the rule back quickly. A new rulemaking could address the APA defects. It would have to engage seriously with SEVIS alternatives, costs and comments. Under this order, though, it could not reimpose program-choice limits on F-1 students without a different answer on statutory authority.
- Litigating other student rules: The WashTech “reasonably related” test now cuts in both directions. It sustained OPT in the D.C. Circuit, and here it invalidated limits on study. Challengers to the proposed OPT fee and to the new CPT limits will likely cite this order for the proposition that DHS’s power over F-1 “conditions” is bounded by the program’s educational purpose.
Dates and decisions to watch
- Notice of appeal: the government generally has 60 days after entry of judgment (Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)), which is about Jan. 15, 2027, if judgment was entered Nov. 16.
- Any motion for a stay pending appeal, first in the district court and then in the First Circuit.
- What happens to the pending First Circuit appeal of the Sept. 14 order, which the final judgment likely moots.
- Any new proposed rule on fixed admission periods in the Federal Register or on the regulatory agenda.
This article is for general information and is not legal advice.
Sources
- Memorandum and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration v. DHS, No. 1:26-cv-13799-FDS, Dkt. 73 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2026)
- Memorandum and Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, same case (D. Mass. Sept. 14, 2026), GovInfo
- Federal Register: Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media, 91 Fed. Reg. 44976 (July 17, 2026)
- 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), Cornell LII
- Immigration Analytics: Duration of Status Rule Blocked in Final Ruling by Boston Judge (Nov. 16, 2026)