AI Generated Image
A federal judge in New York removed a Justice Department lawyer from a class action over ICE warrantless arrests, finding that a government letter misdescribed a court order requiring warrants in the district.
A fight over ICE warrantless arrests in New York has turned into a sanctions fight over the government’s own lawyers. U.S. District Judge Sanket J. Bulsara of the Eastern District of New York on Monday barred Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas R. Price from appearing again in Benitez v. Department of Homeland Security, a class action accusing immigration officers of stopping and arresting people without warrants or legal basis, after finding that a Nov. 4 government letter misrepresented an earlier injunction, Just Security reported Tuesday.
The disqualification is unusual, and the judge signaled that Rule 11 sanctions may follow. The question underneath it matters more to people in Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Long Island: does ICE have to get a warrant before making a civil immigration arrest anywhere in the district, or only before re-arresting one man?
One sentence in a May order, two readings
The order at issue came from Judge Gary R. Brown on May 18, 2026, in Sanchez Alfaro v. Mullin, a habeas case brought by a single petitioner. Brown turned commitments ICE had made in a May 11 filing into a court order. One paragraph is written broadly: “Before effecting a civil immigration arrest in this judicial district, ICE shall obtain a valid warrant of arrest in advance,” unless an officer has reason to believe the person “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” Brown wrote that the requirement was “no greater than” what 8 U.S.C. 1357 already demands and acknowledged it “might have the practical effect of benefiting nonparties.”
Bulsara had asked both sides on Oct. 21 how that order affects Benitez. The government’s Nov. 4 answer, signed by Price, said the May order “imposed relief as to the petitioner there only” and that it “did not impose any injunction on Defendants applicable to this action.”
According to Just Security, Bulsara called the letter “bad faith, a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court,” and described “a pattern of dissembling, obfuscation, and frankly outright misrepresentation.” He ordered supervisors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office to take over the case, gave the government until Nov. 16 to contest Rule 11 sanctions, and directed two other prosecutors listed on the letter to file sworn statements by the same date explaining any role they played in it. The order warns that if the court finds “any future misrepresentation or false statement,” it “will enter a default judgment in this case in favor of Plaintiffs.” The account of Monday’s hearing comes from Just Security alone.
What the warrant rule actually requires
The law at the center of both cases is old and narrow. Section 1357(a)(2) lets an immigration officer arrest without a warrant only when the officer has reason to believe the person is in the country unlawfully and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. The implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. 287.8(c)(2)(ii), repeats that limit. The warrant is typically an administrative Form I-200 signed by an ICE supervisor, not a judge, so the rule forces an individualized decision before the arrest rather than after it.
The Benitez plaintiffs, eight individuals and the Workers’ Center of Central New York, filed suit on April 8, 2026, claiming Fourth Amendment, equal protection and Section 1357 violations. Their complaint alleges that immigration agents arrested 9,346 people in greater New York City and 4,094 elsewhere in the state between Jan. 20, 2025, and March 10, 2026, and that more than 800 “collateral” arrests in the city from August 2025 to March 2026 involved people with no criminal history 85 percent of the time. Those are allegations not yet tested in court.
Why the scope dispute will outlast the sanctions
Both readings have a footing. The government’s tracks Trump v. CASA (2025), which sharply limited relief for people who are not parties to a case, and the order rests on ICE’s commitments to one petitioner. The plaintiffs point to the plain words, “in this judicial district,” which would be surplus if the order covered one man. Bulsara’s reaction suggests he views the government’s reading as untenable, not merely aggressive. Courts tolerate hard advocacy; Rule 11 targets positions unsupported by law or that misstate the record.
The government’s letter also invoked 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), which the Supreme Court in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez (2022) read to bar class-wide injunctions against the operation of certain removal provisions. Whether that bar reaches Section 1357 claims is likely to be litigated if Benitez moves toward class-wide relief.
The episode also fits a pattern of federal judges losing patience with government candor in immigration detention cases, from the contempt inquiry over ICE releases in Colorado to re-arrest contempt fights in Minnesota and Colorado. In Washington state, federal prosecutors have stopped defending many ICE habeas cases, and a federal court recently found a warrantless arrest of a former DACA recipient unlawful.
Dates to watch in Benitez
- Nov. 16, 2026: deadline for the government to contest Rule 11 sanctions and for the two other prosecutors named on the letter to file sworn declarations, according to Just Security.
- Scope ruling: whether Bulsara holds that the May 18 warrant requirement binds ICE district-wide, a ruling likely to be appealed.
- Second Circuit: the pending Yeleshev v. LaRocco appeal (No. 26-1898) on warrants issued after arrest, cited in the government’s letter.
This article is for general information and is not legal advice.
Sources
- Just Security, “Judge Bars DOJ Attorney from Appearing in Case” (Nov. 10, 2026)
- Memorandum and Order, Sanchez Alfaro v. Mullin, No. 26-0766 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2026)
- Government letter, Benitez v. DHS, No. 26-cv-2082 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2026)
- Class action complaint, Benitez v. DHS (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 8, 2026)
- 8 U.S.C. 1357, powers of immigration officers
- 8 C.F.R. 287.8, standards for enforcement activities